Q: You're increasing your holdings in foreign businesses, but not in Japan. What is your analysis? Do you not find Japan attractive? Why?
WB: We've owned stock in four or five Japanese businesses but below the thresholds for reporting. We'd be quite happy to own more. We've tried to buy entire companies in the past without success. We haven't found a lot that look good from a valuation perspective, but we'd love to buy entire Japanese businesses.
CM: We would have owned more stocks if we weren't stupid.
WB: That's true a lot. People like John Templeton found Japan way before everyone else did. I was busy with other things ... probably sucking my thumb.
Q: [from The Guardian] What are your views on the U.K. investment environment? We're about to have a new prime minister [Gordon Brown] -- what would you want him to do?
WB: Raise the 3% reporting threshold for buying businesses. It's always a problem, because there are people who jump in when they find we're buying, and that drives the price up and makes it less attractive for us. If it's a £10 billion business, we have to report when we invest £300 million ($600 million). We like to invest billions.
CM: They're not going to change it just for you.
WB: But we're just as comfortable looking at things on the FTSE than on the S&P.
Q: [from the Times of London] Tell us more about this animation series you mentioned yesterday at the annual meeting.
WB: Andy Huard -- he did "Liberty's Kids" -- is doing it. He's recorded my voice. I'm not writing it but am approving the ideas and can have some editorial input. I like not writing, and I like what he hopes to do. Directed at kids, ages 7-11, tells stories, and hope to get across some ideas to give good habits -- things like steering them away from credit cards, and the like. Sell a few more on Charlie's "Ben Franklin virtues." We're not doing it for money.
Q: [from Bankrate] You're a known supporter of the federal estate tax. This hurts family farm owners, particularly with the $1 million threshold for the tax. Is there a fairer way?
WB: Well, let's say that we raise $30 billion per year from the estate tax, and we then get rid of it. From whom else shall we raise the money. All taxes are unpleasant and hurt, so what is the fairest way to distribute the hurt. We could replace it with a $1,000 tax on the 30,000,000 poorest families, which wouldn't be too popular. We want to hear them suggest an alternative, but they never do.
About 2 million Americans died last year. Estate taxes were filed on less than 2%, and about half the money was raised from 4,000 people. The average after-tax for those folks was over $40 million. If they're receiving $40 million after tax, I'm not too concerned.
CM: You'd support raising the exemption from $1 million to $2 million?
WB: OK, but I think it should get aggressive as the inheritance goes up. As a nation, we didn't believe in the divine right of kings, and we shouldn't believe in the divine rights of the womb. Resources shouldn't reside in those who picked the right womb. We wouldn't want to send an Olympic team made up of the first-born children from the team of 25 years ago. We don't reward members of the "lucky sperm club" in other areas of the world. Why here?
Other than that, I have no opinion.
And I'm seeing Hillary Clinton later tonight, so we'll have much to talk about. (Laughter.)
Q: You have said that you're interested in owning for the long term and you have a bias against divesting anything. With everything that's currently going on, don't you think that a company like yours could make a difference in ethics?
WB: I don't think so. The group that was there yesterday thought we don't do things ethically. But say they were Wesco shareholders -- they couldn't affect the way Berkshire does things. Even the government is limited in how much it can do regarding China. The idea of selling our shares just doesn't make any sense. As another example, Charlie like Costco (NYSE: COST) a lot; perhaps even more than he likes Berkshire. But Costco is the third-largest seller of cigarettes in the U.S. They are right up front in Costco, and they are also marked with some of the lowest margins in the store. But I'm not about to sell Costco stock because they sell cigarettes. As another example, we went to Memphis about 25 years ago to meet with a company. It was a great business, great people, and they sold chewing tobacco.
CM: And they all chewed their own product.
WB: They were terrific people, and they preferred to be bought by Berkshire. We ended up deciding not to buy it, but at the same time that wouldn't prevent me from going out the next day and buying shares of UST (NYSE: UST) -- a major smokeless tobacco company. We also ran ads in the Buffalo News for investing products that I don't like. It's likewise ridiculous to say that one oil company is "purer" than another, since oil is such a commodity. The people yesterday probably would have like to see us sell off all of our position in PetroChina to sink the stock, but that would make no sense. Sudan is going to continue to sell oil, and if the Chinese were to pull out they might even be better off because they'd sell it to someone else and potentially get an even better price. There's a limited supply of oil out there, and though the U.S. doesn't buy Sudan's oil, we sure don't want to see that supply taken off the market.
CM: That said, there are some people that we won't deal with because of morals.
WB: Yes, when we have a say. When PetroChina was planning on issuing shares a few years ago I wrote to them and told them it was a bad idea, they went ahead with it anyway. Overall, we've had little luck changing the way companies operate that we don't own a controlling position in.
CM: The conditions in Darfur are just so terrible and so it's not surprising that people want to do something and strike out against it.
Q: [from CHBC-TV] You have said that return on equity is important for the investment decisions that you make. Just how important is ROE to you currently in making your investments?
WB: Return on capital employed determines how good a given business is. The railroad business, for instance, is not a business that is particularly good in that respect. The Coca-Cola company will make around $7 billion in pre-tax on capital employed that could be $4 [billion] to $5 billion if they wish. See's last year made $75 million on $40 million of capital employed. Union Pacific will spend $2 [billion] to $3 billion for its rails. Return on capital is just not all that high.
While return on capital employed is important, it's even better when you can generate the same returns as you increase the amount of capital employed. The question is how much does it need and how much does it get in return. We really love to see a business with increasing returns on capital employed that can use incremental capital and earn at that same rate. Such businesses are practically nonexistent.
CM: We have all kinds of businesses at Berkshire. Some take a lot of capital, and there are others that don't need as much.
WB: Our utility businesses take lots of capital just to keep up. We'll never get really high returns on that business, and we shouldn't. We have been given the monopoly with those businesses so there's no reason that we should get a bonanza for it.
Q: There are many Asian countries, Singapore in particular, that have been amassing a lot of foreign reserves. What would be your recommendation to the managers of these funds to grow them and do good for the people of the country?
WB: They've done pretty well without us. China was going to buy Unocal with some of those reserves, and we went crazy, even though we were the ones that gave them that money buy buying their products. With a long-term strategy, there are a lot of considerations, and one isn't necessarily doing something that will increase the people's standard of living on that day.
CM: Singapore has managed itself more intelligently than the U.S. The country has come a long way from some horrible beginnings. We should be listening to them.
Q: We've heard a lot about investing today. Can you tell us about how life has been as a newlywed? And Charlie, do you feel slighted that you weren't invited?
WB: We kept it small. We had a judge, my daughter, my wife's sister, two dogs, and a cat -- though they weren't invited. We wanted to keep it quiet until it was done. I hope that I look better than I did last year for it.
Q: With the number of subsidiaries that Berkshire has, how do you get comfortable with succession at any level?
WB: Given the number of managers that we have, I have to be ready to replace any one of them tomorrow. Every couple of years, I ask that each manager send me a letter that gives his suggestion for what I should do if he is gone tomorrow. Along with giving me a suggestion for a replacement, I also ask for the strengths and weaknesses of that person. I've read all of these letters and I know who they're talking about. In some cases we have guys who are 95% as good as the manager currently in place, while in others cases we have someone that's maybe 60% as good. It's always difficult to have to replace a superstar.
But our managers don't leave, and they don't die. I tie immortality into the contract negotiations -- I use immortality whenever I need a tie-breaker. Mr. B. died at 104 after quitting at 103. I use this as an example for my managers of how bad it is to quit.
There are a couple of times where I've had to make a change, but I always hate to do that.
CM: Bringing somebody in from outside Berkshire almost doesn't happen. Most of our replacements work out really well.
WB: Most people working for us like what they're doing and so they want to stay put. Being No. 2 can be difficult because we don't have a mandatory retirement age, and so they can't just wait around for the guy above them to retire. Sometimes this can be bad because people want to move up, but we haven't seen much of this.
CM: Our system is really radically different than what everyone else does. It has been working a lot better.
Q: What do you see as the benefits to joining the EU, and what do you think about opportunities in Estonia?
WB: Our attitude on this is nothing special. We're very happy to buy companies in the EU, and it helps that they have a single currency that stays relatively stable. In general, we don't look at specific sectors or geographies. Charlie and I read the papers every day and get ideas from there, and we also get phone calls sometimes that give us ideas. But we don't have discussions about specific industries or countries.
CM: We also don't have an opinion on Latvian countries joining the EU.
Q: Some people in South Korea say for a variety of reasons that your style of value investing is not applicable in South Korea. Do you think that it is? What advice do you have for the Buffett maniacs in South Korea?
WB: Value investing makes sense any place. When I went to invest personally in Korea I looked for value. Posco came from turning the pages in a directory, and it was a value investment. I used the same decision process as I would if I were investing in the U.S. I get a big book from Citigroup (it's free), and I just turn through the pages. I'm looking for pure value ideas with low ratios and strong balance sheets. I picked out about 20 of them, and the average earnings multiple was 3, and they all had been cleaning up their balance sheets. When you do that there's almost no chance that you don't make money from them. Well, unless war breaks out or there's a major disaster, but you run that risk investing anywhere. Investing is about all about value. You're laying out a dollar today and trying to get more for that tomorrow. This doesn't work if you buy a company making hula hoops or pet rocks, but it does if you're buying a company that makes flour. People aren't going to stop eating flour tomorrow.
CM: And it didn't bother you that South Korea relies so much on exports?
WB: No. If I get 20 companies like these, there is no way you won't make money. I also got an extra kick from the currency.
CM: But there are not always opportunities like that. Korea was suffering from a lot of problems, and people got so pessimistic that they pushed stocks down to levels similar to the U.S. in the 1930s. That's not always going to happen.
WB: There is always a bunch of bad news out there. What other kind of investing is there out there besides value investing? Tip investing, where we go off of rumors? Or no-value investing? Or maybe dream investing. I've just never understood what the alternative is.
Q: There is just so much liquidity out there today. Some say that we're in a golden era with low inflation, low interest rates, and low volatility. At the same time, the difference in wealth between the wealthy and everyone else is the widest it's ever been. Do you expect this environment of liquidity to continue? And why isn't it being spread around more?
WB: The super-rich versus the rest of the country is dramatically changed in the last 15 years. A large part of that is the tax code. The U.S. government has said, if you earn money through a hedge fund or how I do at Berkshire -- work that doesn't cause you to break a sweat -- you pay lower taxes. If I make all of my money through dividends and capital gains I pay a comparatively low tax rate. This has become the favorite class -- apparently Washington believes that the super-rich are endangered as a class.
On liquidity, there's nothing but money running around. Money, money everywhere, but not a drop to drink. It's extraordinary, but situations like this always end the same way. It looked similar back in '69 when I closed my partnership. It has affected a lot of people, and everyone has gotten complacent. The problem with a complacent world is that people end up taking more risk. We can easily have an event that changes everyone's perspective in a hurry. And we will have such an event.
CM: We always have periods of excitement followed by periods of just the opposite. Those in Miami with stretched loans don't feel like there's money everywhere. And we're going to have more occasions like Miami condos. Right now everything is working wonderfully, and the big pension funds and endowments think that if they hire enough advisors they can make 15% for annum, but there is a force out there guaranteeing that they can't do it.
WB: If GDP grows at 5% per year, they can't continue to make 15%. People seem to understand that the entry price on a bond dictates the return, but they don't seem to understand that with stocks.
CM: And they all suspect that the more you pay the advisors, the better the returns will be.
Q: The real estate market has been rapidly cooling lately. Would you consider a purchase in the real estate market if the slowdown continues for another year or two?
WB: We've made deals from time to time in real estate. It's a big market, and if things get too out of whack we could step in.
CM: We didn't do it last time it happened. We've done better in other fields -- we're typically better at buying businesses.
WB: It's really a labor-intensive business, and we're not labor-intensive guys.
Q: Comparing 2007 to 2006, what is your exposure to hurricanes? Do you have any suggestions for public policy in this area?
WB: In 2007 vs. 2006, our exposure is about half, but not across the board. To the extent that prices went down, we have not scaled back equally. We wouldn't mind having more exposure than last year if we thought that prices were appropriate. If there are huge hurricane losses this year and prices are greater next year, we'll take more exposure. We are actually willing to risk a lot of money and expose ourselves to a lot of losses, but we have to be adequately compensated for it.
As for Washington, there should be some level where they are the insurer of last resort, because they are anyway. For banks, the FDIC was set up to provide last resort protection. Why not do the same thing for super catastrophes as the FDIC does for banks?
CM: But the government isn't saving the insurance companies.
WB: No, the insurance companies go broke. You don't save the insurance companies, you save the insured.
Q: What Canadian companies do you admire the most?
WB: You're really insistent on this one! It's not that I don't admire Canadian companies; it's the market cap thing. We don't really look at anything with a market cap less than $20 billion. Other than that I don't have any problem with Canadian companies, I bought my first Canadian stock at 14. We have taken a look at the Canadian banks -- overall, it's a pretty easy country to understand.
CM: There will be immense fortunes made in Canada if oil goes to $200.
WB: The companies involved in the dark sands would do well, but that is a very leveraged play on oil.
Q: There are a number of subsidiaries of Berkshire that have been ranked very low by firms that rank companies on their social impact. Do you have any plans to urge the Berkshire subsidiaries to do better in this respect?
WB: I have no idea how you would go about ranking the S&P 500 companies on a scale like that. I don't know how to rank a company that makes cigarettes vs. one that markets cigarettes or how to compare Chevron to Exxon to BP. If we have a company at Berkshire that's doing something that I don't think we should be doing, I'll talk to the manager. But if people are mad, for example, because Coke makes people fat -- well, I drink Coke and I'm a little fat -- I don't have a problem with it. I don't even know how you would rank something like that.
CM: In a lot of cases, I don't think the people doing philanthropy know whether what they are doing is doing more harm than good.
WB: Take education. It's a very important topic, but there are no easy answers. Or the U.S. as a whole over the last 50 years, what rank would you give there? It's hard to give a grade. It's likewise hard to grade Exxon -- the company has done well in part because of its very low finding costs, which is a great benefit to the world.
CM: If you ask me who has done more good for the world, the Ford Foundation or Exxon, I'd say Exxon.
วันอาทิตย์, พฤษภาคม ๒๗, ๒๕๕๐
เบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์พบผู้สื่อข่าว ตอนที่ 1
หลังงานประชุมใหญ่ประจำปีเมื่อต้นเดือนที่ผ่านมาแล้วเสร็จลง ท่านวอร์เร็น บัฟเฟตต์ และ ท่านชาร์ลี มังเกอร์ ได้เปิดเวทีพบปะผู้สื่อข่าวจากสำนักพิมพ์ต่างๆทั่วโลกซึ่งก็ได้ตั้งคำถามที่น่าสนใจ เพื่อให้ทั้งสองท่านตอบ ซึ่งทั้งสองท่านได้แสดงมุมมองที่น่าสนใจเกี่ยวกับการลงทุนต่างๆทั้งที่เกิดขึ้นแล้วในอดีต และจะเกิดขึ้นในอนาคตไว้อย่างดีเยี่ยม โดยเฉพาะในเรื่องของการซื้อกิจการรถไฟเร็วๆนี้ ทั้งสองท่านยอมรับว่าตนเองโง่ไปตั้งนาน 3-4 ปีกว่าจะเห็นมูลค่าของกิจการดังกล่าว ทั้งนี้ท่านทั้งสองยอมรับว่าเป็นเพราะทัศนะคติต่ออุตสาหกรรมกิจการรถไฟมาแต่ดั้งเดิมแบบมีความลำเอียงมาตลอด
ต่อไปนี้เป็นบันทึกการให้ข้อมูลผู้สื่อข่าวโดย Jim Gillies (TMFCanuck), Alex Dumortier(TMFMarathonMan), and Matt Koppenheffer (TMFKopp) ทั้งนี้โดย Phil Durrell ผู้เป็น TMFAdmiral ที่ the Fool เป็นผู้โพสต์บันทึกนี้จากเวทีพบปะผู้สื่อข่าว(ไม่ได้เป็นบันทึกแบบคำต่อคำ)
One thing that I noted was the that the number of foreign attendees was a lot higher this year perhaps as a result of the Iscar purchase. Total persons at the press conference up at least 50% (my guess)
Notes from the May 6 2007 Press Conference (not verbatim)
By Jim Gillies (TMFCanuck), Alex Dumortier (TMFMarathonMan), and Matt Koppenheffer (TMFKopp)
Q: Thirty years ago, you told investors to put their money into municipal bonds; now you recommend index funds. If people had done the former 30 years ago, they would have left a lot of money on the table.
Warren Buffett: That [original recommendation] was with a 10-year time horizon, and I gave the estimated after-tax return. I can provide you with a copy of that letter. I recommended that my partners put their money with Bill Ruane, and that has worked out very satisfactorily.
For a know-nothing investor, a low-cost index fund will beat professionally managed money. I have a standing offer to anyone who can name five hedge funds or fund-of-funds that will outperform a low-cost index fund. This eliminates survivorship bias -- no one has taken me up on my offer. The gross performance may be the same, but the fees will eat into that compared to a good index fund, which is almost cost-free.
It goes counter to the interests of almost everyone in the business to promote something with very low fees.
If you look at the performance of Fidelity Magellan -- I don't mean to pick on that fund; Peter Lynch did a terrific job there -- but a lot of that performance came from the early years.
Q: You mentioned your ownership interest in Posco (NYSE: PKX) yesterday. Apart from Posco, what other stocks are you buying in Korea?
WB: We talked about Posco because it met our threshold, which was $700 million this year. Otherwise, we don't disclose our purchases -- it's counter to our interests and to those of people who would listen to us. If you run out to buy a stock simply because you found out that somebody else owns it, that probably isn't a very good idea.
Charlie Munger: Korea is an unbelievable example -- it has come a very long way and it started from real hardship. Korea has no material resources, lousy agriculture, they have been invaded by their neighbors at various times, and they've had a longstanding war that has divided them. It's one of the most heartening stories in the history of the world.
I live in a city that has the largest population of Koreans living outside of Korea -- L.A. has 800,000 Koreans. I really like the Koreans, and they have reason to be very proud of themselves.
WB: Isn't the reason you like them because we made a lot of money there [in Korea]? (Laughter.)
Q: On your succession strategy and the qualities of a CIO.
WB: When Lou Simpson came to GEICO, we paid him a minimal salary, and we paid him [a bonus] based on the percentage of outperformance with respect to the S&P 500 on a rolling three-year basis. We didn't assign him a block of money -- he was able to choose the size of the block of money he was managing. Because of the explosion of money being managed by hedge funds in the last few years, Lou Simpson could have been very much more than he is now. He never came to us and said, "I'm being paid '0-and-10' instead of '2-and-20'" [referring to the standard hedge fund fee arrangement in which the manager receives 2% of assets and 20% of investment gains]. That conversation simply never took place.
We could take on as many as three people initially. If I find three what-look-like-Bill Ruanes, I would probably pay them a pretty small salary -- less than they were making previously -- and a percentage of their returns above the index, but that would probably be on a rolling five-year average. I would give them some $2 [billion to] $3 billion initially, and I'll be looking at three things:
One, although there is nothing wrong with managing these sums, I'll also be looking to see who has the potential to scale up to $100 billion. I will also be looking to see who can "get off the tracks" and look around the corner [anticipate the existence of risks that are known to all]. Finally, I'll be looking at whether the person can invest outside of equities. We have made a lot of money in junk bonds, currencies.
CM: In municipal bonds, too!
Q: You mentioned that you might be considering selling some of Berkshire's holdings to make a big acquisition. Can you comment on that?
WB: We aren't currently contemplating it, but we are always ready to do so. We would put a lot of our cash to work first, but we would be ready to sell some marketable securities if it were necessary to fund the purchase. I have sold stocks [trading] at two times earnings to buy something cheaper -- that was a long time ago, and it's not likely to happen again.
Q: What are the fundamental qualities of your successor?
WB: There are two successor questions. On the CEO front, we had already designated three candidates, and all three of them, in many respects, would do a better job at it than I am (but they don't have 30% of the stock, so they'll just have to wait). Those three people are already known to the board. My successor is steeped in the Berkshire tradition and is tremendously able in terms of both operations and capital allocation.
Intelligence isn't everything. The average IQ in that building in Greenwich, Conn. [the offices of Long-Term Capital Management], was probably over 155, wouldn't you say Charlie?
CM: Yes.
WB: But that isn't enough. The guys at Long-Term Capital Management were extremely intelligent, but they just didn't contemplate what could happen -- they thought the future would look like the past.
You shouldn't operate in the financial markets without being aware of the Great North Corner. I hope you are aware that 25 x 23 x 17 x 20 x ... x 0 = 0; you had better be very aware that about what can introduce a zero in that series [Buffett is referring to the possibility that an investment manager can be wiped out in a single year - erasing all previous gains.] Leverage definitely increases the risk or producing a zero.
Q: [From a South African correspondent] If you could elaborate on investing outside the U.S. What percentage of your assets would you be comfortable holding outside of the U.S.? Any comments on Africa, particularly since much of the work of the Gates foundation is focused on Africa.
WB: I must have told 30 South Africans to call me collect if they know of some business that we might be interested in buying and, in fact, I expect several of them to call. One of them may even already have something of interest. The problem is scale -- we have a market capitalization of approximately $160 billion -- a business that generates $10 million in owner earnings a year and is worth $100 million -- so what? That will hardly move the needle for Berkshire.
CM: If the whole country is a kleptocracy, that make it hard to be a rational investor.
WB: That isn't the case of South Africa, though.
CM: No.
Q: [From Grant's Interest Rate Observer] Why don't you follow your own advice and invest in index funds?
WB: I'm happy to hear that, since we suggested that index funds were appropriate for know-nothing investors. (Laughter.) I don't think we fall into that category -- I would be amazed if we couldn't beat the S&P 500 by a couple of percentage points. We won't do 5 points higher, but we can do a couple of points.
CM: We don't have an iron rule that we have to be invested in common stocks. We think that the combination of things we can do still has reasonably attractive prospects. Nevertheless, it isn't easy.
WB: To transfer our investments to an index fund, we would have $14 billion in taxes, so the performance of the index fund would have to compensate us for that interest-free loan we receive from the government. [Buffett is assimilating the deferral of long-term capital gains taxes to an interest-free loan from the government.]
Q: What are the long-term values you see in the newspaper industry, as opposed to a consolidation play?
WB: The long-term owner will face long-term problems. You will see the drift of ownership of papers toward people who like baseball clubs or sacred trusts. If you want to spend $1 billion on something that has value beyond its economic value, you could buy the New York Yankees, and you would immediately become important. If you buy the New York Times, you become even more important. People will do things and spend money to become important -- it's part of human nature.
CM: We are starting to see a transition like that. There is the case of a woman who got divorced in San Diego, and she went ahead and bought the local newspaper. Some of the integrity that existed in the newspaper business came from their monopoly status -- they had nothing to fear from anybody. If you know that your earnings are going to go up next year by a certain percentage, you don't need to be respectful of anybody.
WB: The worse the economics of the business, the greater the temptation to be less than they should be.
CM: I'll never forget that guy who was the head of the FAA. The Wall Street Journal ran a series of articles on him in which they described his corruption. Do you remember?
WB: Sure.
CM: As soon as the first article was published, that guy was a dead man walking.
Q: [from Business Today Weekly in Taiwan] What is your interest in Taiwanese high-tech companies? Also, have heard rumors that you're buying shares in a Chinese steel company.
WB: We won't be commenting on our buying or selling. As for high-tech companies, change is often wonderful, but perhaps not for investments. We're in the business of seeing the future. In effect, what will the next 25 years look like? If it's too tough to figure out, don't even try.
During the Internet boom, I gave an exam to a class, with but a single question. That is, describe an Internet company, and then tell me what it's worth. Anyone who gave an answer flunked. That's the problem in high tech -- a few will profit, but a lot will have problems, and it's hard to see who does what in advance. We know that Snickers bars will still be sold and do well in 10 years. That doesn't make candy a better business; it's just that we know who the winner is.
In 1903, the auto industry (high-tech of the day) in the U.S. had 2,000 companies. The auto industry effected massive change on people's lives -- now, you've got three companies left, two hanging on by their fingernails, and one up for sale. It's the same story with the airlines. Revolutionized life on earth, yet net, they've lost money. Any self-respecting capitalist would have shot Orville down at Kitty Hawk, and we'd all be better off.
Today, you've got two companies in the world making big commercial airliners [Boeing (NYSE: BA) and EADS], and one of them isn't doing too hot. It's much easier to look at consumer habits, and at companies with big barriers to entry. Gillette was easy -- they had 70% market share, selling to men. Men are easy; women are far more complicated. Men don't like change. So Gillette became the friend of every boy through Cavalcade of Sports [Gillette was a major advertiser], and Gillette kept them into adulthood.
CM: Is it hard to predict that Texas brickyards will be producing the vast majority of the bricks in Texas sold in 20 years? It's obvious. Yet this logic is scorned by MBAs from Wharton.
WB: In 1890, there were about 10 billion bricks produced per year in the U.S. Today, it's about the same amount. We produce about 1 billion of them. In 10-15 years, there will still be 10 billion bricks produced, and maybe we'll be making 2 billion of them -- we'll sneak up on the industry. A great business.
CM: It's a different mindset.
WB: See's Candies -- we bought for about $20 million, it's given us about $1.5 billion pre-tax since we bought it.
CM: It's interesting that the business that didn't shun the brickyards is the one that has the AAA credit rating. You think they'd wise up.
Q: [from Journal de Montreal] Who are your preferred Canadian CEOs?
WB: The CEO of Canadian National Railway (NYSE: CNI) has done the best job of anyone in the railroad industry. [It's not clear whether Buffett is referring to the current CEO, E. Hunter Harrison, or the former CEO who stepped down in 2003, Paul Tellier. I can tell you, as a Canadian, that Tellier has a much higher profile in Canada and is largely considered to be responsible for CN's ascendance. Harrison has been much lower key. -- JG.] Bill Gates was way ahead of us on that one [buying CN], and he's made a lot of money.
CM: It's good the money went to someone who needed it. (Laughter.)
Q: [from the New York Times] Will the new CIOs need to become citizens of Omaha?
WB: Not necessarily. Lou Simpson started in Washington, D.C. After five years, he decided he wanted to be in Santa Fe [N.M.]. More recently, he transitioned to Chicago. It's really not important. What is important, is to go where you can think best. The information is all available everywhere. It's just a question of where you think best.
Say we take on two or three people. Perhaps one might want to live in Omaha [Neb.], fine. If a person has a five-minute commute, versus a one-hour commute, we want them where they think best, and to minimize the frictional costs of life.
Q: [from Jim Gillies of The Motley Fool] You recently took a large stake in railroads, particularly Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE: BNI). You talked a little at the meeting yesterday about how much better the business is today than it was 25-30 years ago. But I look at the price two years ago that was roughly half of what it is today, I know that you [Berkshire] had the cash two years ago, and so I ask, what has changed in those two years?
WB: I missed it. It shows how dumb we were two years ago. Burlington wasn't any different two years ago. I do that time and again. I had a bias against railroads, since they were such a terrible business for decades. I had to get rid of my industry bias.
CM: They were a terrible investment for a long time, and it's tough to break a prejudice.
WB: The past price history means nothing. I prefer not to know the stock price when I'm evaluating an investment. I handicapped horses the same way, I didn't want to know the odds before I had come up with what I thought the probabilities were.
CM: We thought about railroads for a long time and developed a bias. Everybody has this trouble. How could we be so stupid? There's an old German saying, "You are too soon old, and too long stupid." It goes to show you that you can have a lot of stupidity and still end up with pretty good results. But stupidity is inevitable. It happens to everyone.
WB: Some ideas take refuge in your head, though they may be false, such as "stocks are better or bonds are better." It all depends on which stocks and which bonds you're talking about. I should have been thinking about Burlington four years ago. I simply wasn't thinking about them [the railroads] -- there's no excuse.
Q: [from Seoul, South Korea] Do you plan to increase your Asian currency holdings? How do you think of emerging markets?
WB: Generally, emerging markets (and the related currencies) are too small for us; we need to make sizable investments. We believe that long-term, Asian currencies will appreciate versus the U.S. dollar, but who knows when? And with a lot of these currencies, the carrying costs are usually negative. You may have a cost of carry of 4%, grinding on you per year. We do, however, like buying businesses making money in other currencies.
We don't shy away from companies making money in Asian currency. And it's a plus if earnings are in currency other than the U.S. dollar.
Q: [from Financial Times] You talked about drift in the reasons that people seek to own newspapers. Is paying a high premium motivated by non-economic reasons?
WB: Do you think Rupert Murdoch has dome interest in The Wall Street Journal that is not economic? Everyone would pay a little more for Dow Jones and The Wall Street Journal than for a steel mill throwing off the exact same cash flows. Or for a brickyard making the same cash flows.
There are certain assets -- sports teams, newspapers, movie studios -- that have a "psychic income" -- power, ego, influence -- and that's something that people will pay for. So, you can calculate the theoretical value of an asset -- that being the discounted sum of the cash flows it will produce forever, but then there's the "B" value on top of the discounted cash flows -- that the "B" value of owning Dow Jones is huge. There are all kinds of people interested in The Wall Street Journal ... they just don't all have checks that would clear.
Q: [from a French paper] Have you considered investing in France? Your opinion of the business environment?
WB: It's a matter of record, we own a little stock in Sanofi-Aventis (NYSE: SNY). We're totally open to a good-sized business in countries like France, Germany, the U.K., etc.
Q: [from Chosun] China is getting bigger, much faster, and becoming one of the dominant powers, even in financial markets. We saw what happened with the Shanghai market earlier this year. How you do size up the Chinese economy, and how do you account for risk?
WB: We're going to open a large Iscar plant in China in October. Coke (NYSE: KO) -- China is the fourth-largest market for them. Fruit of the Loom, we buy from China. We buy a lot of furniture from China -- they're a huge supplier for us.
I look back at 1790 - there were less than 4 million people in the U.S. and 290 million in China. What happened? The U.S. today has 25% of the world's GDP, not because we were smarter or more fortunate, but because our production of goods was better. China has caught on fast with respect to their untapped potential. They haven't ignored the rest of the world the way they did. They're starting to use that untapped resource.
There's no reason that those people in China couldn't have done as well as we did in the U.S., but the system didn't allow it.
CM: They had a system that decreased the potential of their own people. They also had so many people for that time that they were butting up against the carrying capacity of their environment. They didn't have a wide-open continent like we did in North America [the Native American population would have argued this point. -- JG] But that's over.
WB: We like businesses that will travel well. Iscar -- now in over 60 countries. See's Candies doesn't travel well -- it does well in its native environment, California. Coke travels extremely well. Dr. Pepper has huge market share in its home area (Texas) but has insignificant share in, say, Boston. It's interesting to see what does travel, and what does not. It's really interesting to consider what will travel to China. And we like earnings in currency that we think will appreciate.
Q: You've said that pharmaceutical stocks are in the "too hard" pile. So why are you now in Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ)?
WB: Well, Johnson & Johnson is more than pharma. We understand Johnson & Johnson. We don't understand who's going to come up with a blockbuster drug next.
CM: They don't, either. (Laughter.)
WB: You could have a situation where we'd buy a basket of pharma stocks.
CM: We've done something like that in the past with respect to banks and newspapers.
Q: You like to drink Coke. You look so strong and healthy. How long are you planning on working at Berkshire?
WB: I like lots of calories. I've never smoked. Never drank. I have a no-stress job. (Laughter.) I'm surrounded by people I love. What could be better? If everything is favoring you, what can be bad.
CM: He's also related to people who lived a long time.
WB: I did eventually buy my mother an exercise bike when she was 80. I figured, the longer she lived, the better it portended for me. (Laughter.)
ต่อไปนี้เป็นบันทึกการให้ข้อมูลผู้สื่อข่าวโดย Jim Gillies (TMFCanuck), Alex Dumortier(TMFMarathonMan), and Matt Koppenheffer (TMFKopp) ทั้งนี้โดย Phil Durrell ผู้เป็น TMFAdmiral ที่ the Fool เป็นผู้โพสต์บันทึกนี้จากเวทีพบปะผู้สื่อข่าว(ไม่ได้เป็นบันทึกแบบคำต่อคำ)
One thing that I noted was the that the number of foreign attendees was a lot higher this year perhaps as a result of the Iscar purchase. Total persons at the press conference up at least 50% (my guess)
Notes from the May 6 2007 Press Conference (not verbatim)
By Jim Gillies (TMFCanuck), Alex Dumortier (TMFMarathonMan), and Matt Koppenheffer (TMFKopp)
Q: Thirty years ago, you told investors to put their money into municipal bonds; now you recommend index funds. If people had done the former 30 years ago, they would have left a lot of money on the table.
Warren Buffett: That [original recommendation] was with a 10-year time horizon, and I gave the estimated after-tax return. I can provide you with a copy of that letter. I recommended that my partners put their money with Bill Ruane, and that has worked out very satisfactorily.
For a know-nothing investor, a low-cost index fund will beat professionally managed money. I have a standing offer to anyone who can name five hedge funds or fund-of-funds that will outperform a low-cost index fund. This eliminates survivorship bias -- no one has taken me up on my offer. The gross performance may be the same, but the fees will eat into that compared to a good index fund, which is almost cost-free.
It goes counter to the interests of almost everyone in the business to promote something with very low fees.
If you look at the performance of Fidelity Magellan -- I don't mean to pick on that fund; Peter Lynch did a terrific job there -- but a lot of that performance came from the early years.
Q: You mentioned your ownership interest in Posco (NYSE: PKX) yesterday. Apart from Posco, what other stocks are you buying in Korea?
WB: We talked about Posco because it met our threshold, which was $700 million this year. Otherwise, we don't disclose our purchases -- it's counter to our interests and to those of people who would listen to us. If you run out to buy a stock simply because you found out that somebody else owns it, that probably isn't a very good idea.
Charlie Munger: Korea is an unbelievable example -- it has come a very long way and it started from real hardship. Korea has no material resources, lousy agriculture, they have been invaded by their neighbors at various times, and they've had a longstanding war that has divided them. It's one of the most heartening stories in the history of the world.
I live in a city that has the largest population of Koreans living outside of Korea -- L.A. has 800,000 Koreans. I really like the Koreans, and they have reason to be very proud of themselves.
WB: Isn't the reason you like them because we made a lot of money there [in Korea]? (Laughter.)
Q: On your succession strategy and the qualities of a CIO.
WB: When Lou Simpson came to GEICO, we paid him a minimal salary, and we paid him [a bonus] based on the percentage of outperformance with respect to the S&P 500 on a rolling three-year basis. We didn't assign him a block of money -- he was able to choose the size of the block of money he was managing. Because of the explosion of money being managed by hedge funds in the last few years, Lou Simpson could have been very much more than he is now. He never came to us and said, "I'm being paid '0-and-10' instead of '2-and-20'" [referring to the standard hedge fund fee arrangement in which the manager receives 2% of assets and 20% of investment gains]. That conversation simply never took place.
We could take on as many as three people initially. If I find three what-look-like-Bill Ruanes, I would probably pay them a pretty small salary -- less than they were making previously -- and a percentage of their returns above the index, but that would probably be on a rolling five-year average. I would give them some $2 [billion to] $3 billion initially, and I'll be looking at three things:
One, although there is nothing wrong with managing these sums, I'll also be looking to see who has the potential to scale up to $100 billion. I will also be looking to see who can "get off the tracks" and look around the corner [anticipate the existence of risks that are known to all]. Finally, I'll be looking at whether the person can invest outside of equities. We have made a lot of money in junk bonds, currencies.
CM: In municipal bonds, too!
Q: You mentioned that you might be considering selling some of Berkshire's holdings to make a big acquisition. Can you comment on that?
WB: We aren't currently contemplating it, but we are always ready to do so. We would put a lot of our cash to work first, but we would be ready to sell some marketable securities if it were necessary to fund the purchase. I have sold stocks [trading] at two times earnings to buy something cheaper -- that was a long time ago, and it's not likely to happen again.
Q: What are the fundamental qualities of your successor?
WB: There are two successor questions. On the CEO front, we had already designated three candidates, and all three of them, in many respects, would do a better job at it than I am (but they don't have 30% of the stock, so they'll just have to wait). Those three people are already known to the board. My successor is steeped in the Berkshire tradition and is tremendously able in terms of both operations and capital allocation.
Intelligence isn't everything. The average IQ in that building in Greenwich, Conn. [the offices of Long-Term Capital Management], was probably over 155, wouldn't you say Charlie?
CM: Yes.
WB: But that isn't enough. The guys at Long-Term Capital Management were extremely intelligent, but they just didn't contemplate what could happen -- they thought the future would look like the past.
You shouldn't operate in the financial markets without being aware of the Great North Corner. I hope you are aware that 25 x 23 x 17 x 20 x ... x 0 = 0; you had better be very aware that about what can introduce a zero in that series [Buffett is referring to the possibility that an investment manager can be wiped out in a single year - erasing all previous gains.] Leverage definitely increases the risk or producing a zero.
Q: [From a South African correspondent] If you could elaborate on investing outside the U.S. What percentage of your assets would you be comfortable holding outside of the U.S.? Any comments on Africa, particularly since much of the work of the Gates foundation is focused on Africa.
WB: I must have told 30 South Africans to call me collect if they know of some business that we might be interested in buying and, in fact, I expect several of them to call. One of them may even already have something of interest. The problem is scale -- we have a market capitalization of approximately $160 billion -- a business that generates $10 million in owner earnings a year and is worth $100 million -- so what? That will hardly move the needle for Berkshire.
CM: If the whole country is a kleptocracy, that make it hard to be a rational investor.
WB: That isn't the case of South Africa, though.
CM: No.
Q: [From Grant's Interest Rate Observer] Why don't you follow your own advice and invest in index funds?
WB: I'm happy to hear that, since we suggested that index funds were appropriate for know-nothing investors. (Laughter.) I don't think we fall into that category -- I would be amazed if we couldn't beat the S&P 500 by a couple of percentage points. We won't do 5 points higher, but we can do a couple of points.
CM: We don't have an iron rule that we have to be invested in common stocks. We think that the combination of things we can do still has reasonably attractive prospects. Nevertheless, it isn't easy.
WB: To transfer our investments to an index fund, we would have $14 billion in taxes, so the performance of the index fund would have to compensate us for that interest-free loan we receive from the government. [Buffett is assimilating the deferral of long-term capital gains taxes to an interest-free loan from the government.]
Q: What are the long-term values you see in the newspaper industry, as opposed to a consolidation play?
WB: The long-term owner will face long-term problems. You will see the drift of ownership of papers toward people who like baseball clubs or sacred trusts. If you want to spend $1 billion on something that has value beyond its economic value, you could buy the New York Yankees, and you would immediately become important. If you buy the New York Times, you become even more important. People will do things and spend money to become important -- it's part of human nature.
CM: We are starting to see a transition like that. There is the case of a woman who got divorced in San Diego, and she went ahead and bought the local newspaper. Some of the integrity that existed in the newspaper business came from their monopoly status -- they had nothing to fear from anybody. If you know that your earnings are going to go up next year by a certain percentage, you don't need to be respectful of anybody.
WB: The worse the economics of the business, the greater the temptation to be less than they should be.
CM: I'll never forget that guy who was the head of the FAA. The Wall Street Journal ran a series of articles on him in which they described his corruption. Do you remember?
WB: Sure.
CM: As soon as the first article was published, that guy was a dead man walking.
Q: [from Business Today Weekly in Taiwan] What is your interest in Taiwanese high-tech companies? Also, have heard rumors that you're buying shares in a Chinese steel company.
WB: We won't be commenting on our buying or selling. As for high-tech companies, change is often wonderful, but perhaps not for investments. We're in the business of seeing the future. In effect, what will the next 25 years look like? If it's too tough to figure out, don't even try.
During the Internet boom, I gave an exam to a class, with but a single question. That is, describe an Internet company, and then tell me what it's worth. Anyone who gave an answer flunked. That's the problem in high tech -- a few will profit, but a lot will have problems, and it's hard to see who does what in advance. We know that Snickers bars will still be sold and do well in 10 years. That doesn't make candy a better business; it's just that we know who the winner is.
In 1903, the auto industry (high-tech of the day) in the U.S. had 2,000 companies. The auto industry effected massive change on people's lives -- now, you've got three companies left, two hanging on by their fingernails, and one up for sale. It's the same story with the airlines. Revolutionized life on earth, yet net, they've lost money. Any self-respecting capitalist would have shot Orville down at Kitty Hawk, and we'd all be better off.
Today, you've got two companies in the world making big commercial airliners [Boeing (NYSE: BA) and EADS], and one of them isn't doing too hot. It's much easier to look at consumer habits, and at companies with big barriers to entry. Gillette was easy -- they had 70% market share, selling to men. Men are easy; women are far more complicated. Men don't like change. So Gillette became the friend of every boy through Cavalcade of Sports [Gillette was a major advertiser], and Gillette kept them into adulthood.
CM: Is it hard to predict that Texas brickyards will be producing the vast majority of the bricks in Texas sold in 20 years? It's obvious. Yet this logic is scorned by MBAs from Wharton.
WB: In 1890, there were about 10 billion bricks produced per year in the U.S. Today, it's about the same amount. We produce about 1 billion of them. In 10-15 years, there will still be 10 billion bricks produced, and maybe we'll be making 2 billion of them -- we'll sneak up on the industry. A great business.
CM: It's a different mindset.
WB: See's Candies -- we bought for about $20 million, it's given us about $1.5 billion pre-tax since we bought it.
CM: It's interesting that the business that didn't shun the brickyards is the one that has the AAA credit rating. You think they'd wise up.
Q: [from Journal de Montreal] Who are your preferred Canadian CEOs?
WB: The CEO of Canadian National Railway (NYSE: CNI) has done the best job of anyone in the railroad industry. [It's not clear whether Buffett is referring to the current CEO, E. Hunter Harrison, or the former CEO who stepped down in 2003, Paul Tellier. I can tell you, as a Canadian, that Tellier has a much higher profile in Canada and is largely considered to be responsible for CN's ascendance. Harrison has been much lower key. -- JG.] Bill Gates was way ahead of us on that one [buying CN], and he's made a lot of money.
CM: It's good the money went to someone who needed it. (Laughter.)
Q: [from the New York Times] Will the new CIOs need to become citizens of Omaha?
WB: Not necessarily. Lou Simpson started in Washington, D.C. After five years, he decided he wanted to be in Santa Fe [N.M.]. More recently, he transitioned to Chicago. It's really not important. What is important, is to go where you can think best. The information is all available everywhere. It's just a question of where you think best.
Say we take on two or three people. Perhaps one might want to live in Omaha [Neb.], fine. If a person has a five-minute commute, versus a one-hour commute, we want them where they think best, and to minimize the frictional costs of life.
Q: [from Jim Gillies of The Motley Fool] You recently took a large stake in railroads, particularly Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE: BNI). You talked a little at the meeting yesterday about how much better the business is today than it was 25-30 years ago. But I look at the price two years ago that was roughly half of what it is today, I know that you [Berkshire] had the cash two years ago, and so I ask, what has changed in those two years?
WB: I missed it. It shows how dumb we were two years ago. Burlington wasn't any different two years ago. I do that time and again. I had a bias against railroads, since they were such a terrible business for decades. I had to get rid of my industry bias.
CM: They were a terrible investment for a long time, and it's tough to break a prejudice.
WB: The past price history means nothing. I prefer not to know the stock price when I'm evaluating an investment. I handicapped horses the same way, I didn't want to know the odds before I had come up with what I thought the probabilities were.
CM: We thought about railroads for a long time and developed a bias. Everybody has this trouble. How could we be so stupid? There's an old German saying, "You are too soon old, and too long stupid." It goes to show you that you can have a lot of stupidity and still end up with pretty good results. But stupidity is inevitable. It happens to everyone.
WB: Some ideas take refuge in your head, though they may be false, such as "stocks are better or bonds are better." It all depends on which stocks and which bonds you're talking about. I should have been thinking about Burlington four years ago. I simply wasn't thinking about them [the railroads] -- there's no excuse.
Q: [from Seoul, South Korea] Do you plan to increase your Asian currency holdings? How do you think of emerging markets?
WB: Generally, emerging markets (and the related currencies) are too small for us; we need to make sizable investments. We believe that long-term, Asian currencies will appreciate versus the U.S. dollar, but who knows when? And with a lot of these currencies, the carrying costs are usually negative. You may have a cost of carry of 4%, grinding on you per year. We do, however, like buying businesses making money in other currencies.
We don't shy away from companies making money in Asian currency. And it's a plus if earnings are in currency other than the U.S. dollar.
Q: [from Financial Times] You talked about drift in the reasons that people seek to own newspapers. Is paying a high premium motivated by non-economic reasons?
WB: Do you think Rupert Murdoch has dome interest in The Wall Street Journal that is not economic? Everyone would pay a little more for Dow Jones and The Wall Street Journal than for a steel mill throwing off the exact same cash flows. Or for a brickyard making the same cash flows.
There are certain assets -- sports teams, newspapers, movie studios -- that have a "psychic income" -- power, ego, influence -- and that's something that people will pay for. So, you can calculate the theoretical value of an asset -- that being the discounted sum of the cash flows it will produce forever, but then there's the "B" value on top of the discounted cash flows -- that the "B" value of owning Dow Jones is huge. There are all kinds of people interested in The Wall Street Journal ... they just don't all have checks that would clear.
Q: [from a French paper] Have you considered investing in France? Your opinion of the business environment?
WB: It's a matter of record, we own a little stock in Sanofi-Aventis (NYSE: SNY). We're totally open to a good-sized business in countries like France, Germany, the U.K., etc.
Q: [from Chosun] China is getting bigger, much faster, and becoming one of the dominant powers, even in financial markets. We saw what happened with the Shanghai market earlier this year. How you do size up the Chinese economy, and how do you account for risk?
WB: We're going to open a large Iscar plant in China in October. Coke (NYSE: KO) -- China is the fourth-largest market for them. Fruit of the Loom, we buy from China. We buy a lot of furniture from China -- they're a huge supplier for us.
I look back at 1790 - there were less than 4 million people in the U.S. and 290 million in China. What happened? The U.S. today has 25% of the world's GDP, not because we were smarter or more fortunate, but because our production of goods was better. China has caught on fast with respect to their untapped potential. They haven't ignored the rest of the world the way they did. They're starting to use that untapped resource.
There's no reason that those people in China couldn't have done as well as we did in the U.S., but the system didn't allow it.
CM: They had a system that decreased the potential of their own people. They also had so many people for that time that they were butting up against the carrying capacity of their environment. They didn't have a wide-open continent like we did in North America [the Native American population would have argued this point. -- JG] But that's over.
WB: We like businesses that will travel well. Iscar -- now in over 60 countries. See's Candies doesn't travel well -- it does well in its native environment, California. Coke travels extremely well. Dr. Pepper has huge market share in its home area (Texas) but has insignificant share in, say, Boston. It's interesting to see what does travel, and what does not. It's really interesting to consider what will travel to China. And we like earnings in currency that we think will appreciate.
Q: You've said that pharmaceutical stocks are in the "too hard" pile. So why are you now in Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ)?
WB: Well, Johnson & Johnson is more than pharma. We understand Johnson & Johnson. We don't understand who's going to come up with a blockbuster drug next.
CM: They don't, either. (Laughter.)
WB: You could have a situation where we'd buy a basket of pharma stocks.
CM: We've done something like that in the past with respect to banks and newspapers.
Q: You like to drink Coke. You look so strong and healthy. How long are you planning on working at Berkshire?
WB: I like lots of calories. I've never smoked. Never drank. I have a no-stress job. (Laughter.) I'm surrounded by people I love. What could be better? If everything is favoring you, what can be bad.
CM: He's also related to people who lived a long time.
WB: I did eventually buy my mother an exercise bike when she was 80. I figured, the longer she lived, the better it portended for me. (Laughter.)
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"ผมไม่ได้มีความพยายามหรือตั้งใจว่าชีวิตนี้จะมาเป็นผู้ช่วยของผู้นำกลุ่มคลั่งลัทธิความเชื่อทางปัญญาแต่อย่างใดเลย"
นั่นเป็นคำพูดของ ชาร์ลี มังเกอร์ กล่าวต้อนรับผู้ถือหุ้นในงานประชุมประจำปีของบริษัทเวสโก้ แน่นอนที่กลุ่มคลั่งลัทธิความเชื่อทางปัญญาคือ กลุ่มนักลงทุนแบบเน้นมูลค่าผู้เต็มเปี่ยมไปด้วยศรัทธาและเดินทางเข้าไปเบียดเสียดยัดเยียดกันที่ โอมาฮา, เนบราสก้า และพาซาดีน่า,แคลิฟอร์เนีย ในฤดูใบไม้ผลิตของทุกปีเพื่อเข้าศึกษาหาความรู้ตรง ณ แทบเท้าของวอร์เร็น บัฟเฟตต์และชาร์ลี มังเกอร์ และอย่างที่มังเกอร์บอกว่า "เพื่อว่าเมื่อกลับบ้านจะได้มีความเฉลี่ยวฉลาดเพิ่มมากกว่าตอนที่มา"
การประชุมปีนี้จัดขึ้นภายในบริเวณเต้นท์ขนาดใหญ่มโหฬารในศูนย์ประชุมเมืองพาซาเดน่า มังเกอร์เรียกเต้นท์ที่ถูกออกแบบด้วยโครงสร้างทางวิศวกรรมที่น่าประทับใจนี้ว่า " ของขวัญแด่ความศิวิไลซ์"
เนื้อหาการพูดของมังเกอร์ในปีนี้มุ่งประเด็นไปที่เหตุผลต่างๆที่ทำให้บัฟเฟตต์และ เบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์ประสบความสำเร็จแบบชนิดโดดเด่นสุดยอดอย่างหาที่เปรียบไม่ได้ มังเกอร์สาธยายถึงปัจจัยต่างๆที่มาประจบพร้อมเพรียงกันส่งให้เกิดผลสำเร็จด้านการลงทุนและธุรกิจแบบชนิดเป็นที่ฮือฮาในประวัติศาสตร์ของเศรษฐระบบกิจทุนนิยม ปัจจัยต่างๆดังกล่าวประกอบด้วย
ความเฉลี่ยวฉลาดด้านอารมณ์และจิตใจ (Mental Aptitude) อย่างที่ทราบกัน วอร์เร็น บัฟเฟตต์ เป็นบุคคลที่มีความเฉลี่ยวฉลาดมากๆ แต่มังเกอร์ บอกว่า เขาน่าจะประสบความสำเร็จมากเกินไปเทียบกับความสามารถทางจิตใจและอารมณ์ที่มีมาแต่กำเนิด ตัวอย่างเช่น ด้วยการปิดตาเล่นเชสส์บัฟเฟตต์ไม่สามารถเอาชนะคนที่มาร่วมเล่นเช็สส์ด้วยกันทั้งหมดทุกๆคนอย่างเช่นแชมป์เชสส์แห่งอเมริกาชื่อ แพทริค วูล์ฟฟ์ ( วูล์ฟฟ์ เอาชนะคู่แข่งทุกคนขณะเวลาเดียวกันด้วยกันเล่นแบบปิดตาที่งานประชุมประจำปีของเบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์) ด้วยอารมณ์ขันแบบฝืดๆอย่างอ้อมแอ้มไม่เต็มปากเต็มคำมังเกอร์เรียกความชำนาญของวูล์ฟฟ์ เพียงแค่ว่า "น่าสนใจดี"
ความสนใจอย่างยิ่งยวด (Intense Interest) มังเกอร์ให้ข้อสังเกตุไว้ว่า บัฟเฟตต์ให้ความใส่ใจด้วยความสนใจอย่างยิ่งยวดในธุรกิจและลงทุนมาตั้งแต่อายุยังน้อยมากๆ "ไม่มีอะไรมาทดแทนความใส่ใจด้วยความสนใจอย่างยิ่งยวดมากๆได้"
เริ่มต้นแต่อายุน้อยๆ(Early Start) อีกปัจจัยที่นำมาซึ่งความสำเร็จของเบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์ ก็คือ บัฟเฟตต์เริ่มลงทุนตั้งแต่อายุยังน้อยและสามารถใช้ความชำนิชำนาญของเขามาทำให้เงินทุนเกิดการงอกเงยแบบทบต้นตลอดช่วงหลายๆทศวรรษที่ผ่านมา
การศึกษาเรียนรู้แบบไม่หยุดยั้ง (Constant Learning) มังเกอร์กล่าวว่า บัฟเฟตต์ เปรียบเสมือน"เครื่องที่ทำหน้าที่ศึกษาเล่าเรียน"ที่ดีที่สุด ปัจจัยหลักที่นำมาซึ่งความสำเร็จก็คือ การเรียนรู้อย่างต่อเนื่องตลอดชั่วชีวิตของคุณด้วยความอยากชนิดมูมมาม ต่อมามังเกอร์ได้วกกลับมาพูดถึงหัวข้อนี้อีกโดยบอกว่าวิธีการให้ได้มาซึ่งปัญญาภูมิทำได้โดย"นั่งลงเอาหลังคุณพิงเก้าอี้และอ่านตลอดทั้งวัน"
มุ่งสมาธิอย่างจดจ่อ (Concentration) อีกปัจจัยที่นำมาซึ่งความสำเร็จของเบิร์กชัวร์ ก็คือ การทุ่มเททางจิตใจอย่างหนักโดยจดจ่อสมาธิต่องานด้วยตัวบัฟเฟตต์เอง "เป็นเรื่องยากที่จะนึกถึงคณะกรรมการต่างๆที่ได้เคยประสบความสำเร็จ" มังเกอร์เปรียบเฉกเช่นกลยุทธของจอห์น วู๊ดเด็นที่ใช้วิธีหมุนเวียนผู้เล่นในทีม โค้ชผู้ยิ่งใหญ่ของ ยูซีแอลเอ จะใช้ผู้เล่นแค่ 7 คน จากทั้งหมด 12 คนเล่น ทั้งนี้เพื่อจะได้สามารถมุ่งเน้นถ่ายทอดประสบการณ์ให้กับผู้เล่นที่เก่งที่สุด 7 คนเหล่านั้น ในทำนองเดียวกันงานส่วนใหญ่ของเบิร์กชัวร์จะได้รับการเอาใจใส่ด้วยสมาธิที่จดจ่อจากผู้ที่มีจิตใจดีที่สุดในองค์กร นั่นก็คือ จิตใจของบัฟเฟตต์
โน็ตสำหรับการดำรงค์ชีพอย่างเป็นสุข
มังเกอร์ ได้ให้ข้อแนะนำสำหรับการมีชีวิตอย่างเป็นสุขด้วยอารมณ์ขันและแจ่มแจ้ง ต่อไปนี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งหัวใจของภูมิปัญญาที่ว่า
- มังเกอร์ กล่าวว่า ผู้คนที่เฉลี่ยวฉลาดจำนวนมากปิดกั้นตัวเองด้วยความไม่เข้าท่า ตัวอย่างอันหนึ่ง คือ การเป็นคนประเภทมีอุดมคติสุดๆ เท่ากับว่า"เป็นการนำเอาสมองของคุณออกมาแล้วเริ่มลงมือใช้ฆ้อนทุบมัน"
- มุ่งเน้นไว้ในชีวิตว่า "ต้องทำให้เป้าหมายที่ตั้งไว้บรรลุถึงจุดสูงสุด"
- "คุณต้องเรียนรู้ที่จะเสาะแสวงหาวิธีการเรียนรู้"
- "เป็นเรื่องไร้สาระอย่างสิ้นเชิงที่จะมัวแต่คิดว่าโลกนี้ไม่ได้ให้ความยุติธรรมกับคุณเลย เรื่องยากที่เกินความสามารถที่มีอยู่เดิมทุกๆเรื่อง นั่นแหละคือโอกาส"
- "การมีเหตุมีผลเพิ่มขึ้นอีกเล็กน้อยจะทำให้คุณสามารถทำอะไรได้มากกว่าที่เคยได้โดยไม่ถูกทำโทษ"
- "ผมจะไม่บ่นเรื่องของอายุผมเพราะถ้าไม่มีอายุมาเกี่ยวข้อง ก็เท่ากับว่าผมก้อตายแค่นั้นเอง"
บทส่งท้าย
มีผู้ตั้งคำถามคนหนึ่งถามเกี่ยวกับเรื่องความเชื่อแบบชนิดยึดติดอย่างมากที่มังเกอร์ได้สลัดทิ้งออกไปเมื่อเร็วๆนี้ ภายหลังครุ่นคิดอยู่พักใหญ่ มังเกอร์กล่าวตอบแสดงความเห็นว่า การที่เบิร์กชัวร์เข้าซื้อหุ้นกิจการรถไฟเมื่อไม่นานมานี้เป็นการบ่งชี้ถึงการเปลี่ยนแนวคิดต่ออุตสาหกรรมดังกล่าวอย่างชนิดที่หมุนกลับมุม 180 องศา ตามที่มังเกอร์พูดปัจจุบันการรถไฟมีความได้เปรียบทางการแข่งขันอย่างมหาศาลเหนือกว่ารถบรรทุก อย่างเช่น การจัดทำรถขนสินค้าแบบ 2 ชั้น และการใช้ระบบคอมพิวเตอร์ควบคุมระบบการเดินรถ มังเกอร์บอกว่าเขาและบัฟเฟตต์เข้าใจถึงความเปลี่ยนแปลงต่างๆนี้ช้าเกินไปและน่าที่จะทำเงินได้มากกว่านี้ อย่างที่เห็นๆ บิล เกตส์เข้าใจเรื่องนี้ตั้งแต่เมื่อ 2 ปีก่อนและได้ทำเงินในอัตราหลายเท่าจากกิจการรถไฟ
มังเกอร์แนะนำหนังสือ 2 เล่ม ได้แก่ The Martains of Science: Five Physicists Who Changed the Twentieth Century by Istvan Hagittai and Einstein: His Life and Unverse by Walter Isaacson. มังเกอร์บอกว่าเขาได้เคยอ่านหนังสือประวัติของไอน์สไตน์ทุกเล่ม และเล่มใหม่ล่าสุดดังกล่าวที่แต่งโดย Isaacson เป็นเล่มดีที่สุด
ตลาดแบบไร้ประสิทธิภาพมี 2 ชนิด ชนิดหนึ่ง เป็นไปแบบไม่ชัดเจนแทบสังเกตุไม่เห็น และอีกชนิดเกิดจากการกระทำของคนโง่ อย่างหลังนี้เกิดขึ้นอยู่เรื่อยเป็นพักๆ
ตวน แทรน มีหุ้นที่พูดไว้ข้างต้นจำนวนหนึ่ง: BRK.B
"ผมไม่ได้มีความพยายามหรือตั้งใจว่าชีวิตนี้จะมาเป็นผู้ช่วยของผู้นำกลุ่มคลั่งลัทธิความเชื่อทางปัญญาแต่อย่างใดเลย"
นั่นเป็นคำพูดของ ชาร์ลี มังเกอร์ กล่าวต้อนรับผู้ถือหุ้นในงานประชุมประจำปีของบริษัทเวสโก้ แน่นอนที่กลุ่มคลั่งลัทธิความเชื่อทางปัญญาคือ กลุ่มนักลงทุนแบบเน้นมูลค่าผู้เต็มเปี่ยมไปด้วยศรัทธาและเดินทางเข้าไปเบียดเสียดยัดเยียดกันที่ โอมาฮา, เนบราสก้า และพาซาดีน่า,แคลิฟอร์เนีย ในฤดูใบไม้ผลิตของทุกปีเพื่อเข้าศึกษาหาความรู้ตรง ณ แทบเท้าของวอร์เร็น บัฟเฟตต์และชาร์ลี มังเกอร์ และอย่างที่มังเกอร์บอกว่า "เพื่อว่าเมื่อกลับบ้านจะได้มีความเฉลี่ยวฉลาดเพิ่มมากกว่าตอนที่มา"
การประชุมปีนี้จัดขึ้นภายในบริเวณเต้นท์ขนาดใหญ่มโหฬารในศูนย์ประชุมเมืองพาซาเดน่า มังเกอร์เรียกเต้นท์ที่ถูกออกแบบด้วยโครงสร้างทางวิศวกรรมที่น่าประทับใจนี้ว่า " ของขวัญแด่ความศิวิไลซ์"
เนื้อหาการพูดของมังเกอร์ในปีนี้มุ่งประเด็นไปที่เหตุผลต่างๆที่ทำให้บัฟเฟตต์และ เบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์ประสบความสำเร็จแบบชนิดโดดเด่นสุดยอดอย่างหาที่เปรียบไม่ได้ มังเกอร์สาธยายถึงปัจจัยต่างๆที่มาประจบพร้อมเพรียงกันส่งให้เกิดผลสำเร็จด้านการลงทุนและธุรกิจแบบชนิดเป็นที่ฮือฮาในประวัติศาสตร์ของเศรษฐระบบกิจทุนนิยม ปัจจัยต่างๆดังกล่าวประกอบด้วย
ความเฉลี่ยวฉลาดด้านอารมณ์และจิตใจ (Mental Aptitude) อย่างที่ทราบกัน วอร์เร็น บัฟเฟตต์ เป็นบุคคลที่มีความเฉลี่ยวฉลาดมากๆ แต่มังเกอร์ บอกว่า เขาน่าจะประสบความสำเร็จมากเกินไปเทียบกับความสามารถทางจิตใจและอารมณ์ที่มีมาแต่กำเนิด ตัวอย่างเช่น ด้วยการปิดตาเล่นเชสส์บัฟเฟตต์ไม่สามารถเอาชนะคนที่มาร่วมเล่นเช็สส์ด้วยกันทั้งหมดทุกๆคนอย่างเช่นแชมป์เชสส์แห่งอเมริกาชื่อ แพทริค วูล์ฟฟ์ ( วูล์ฟฟ์ เอาชนะคู่แข่งทุกคนขณะเวลาเดียวกันด้วยกันเล่นแบบปิดตาที่งานประชุมประจำปีของเบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์) ด้วยอารมณ์ขันแบบฝืดๆอย่างอ้อมแอ้มไม่เต็มปากเต็มคำมังเกอร์เรียกความชำนาญของวูล์ฟฟ์ เพียงแค่ว่า "น่าสนใจดี"
ความสนใจอย่างยิ่งยวด (Intense Interest) มังเกอร์ให้ข้อสังเกตุไว้ว่า บัฟเฟตต์ให้ความใส่ใจด้วยความสนใจอย่างยิ่งยวดในธุรกิจและลงทุนมาตั้งแต่อายุยังน้อยมากๆ "ไม่มีอะไรมาทดแทนความใส่ใจด้วยความสนใจอย่างยิ่งยวดมากๆได้"
เริ่มต้นแต่อายุน้อยๆ(Early Start) อีกปัจจัยที่นำมาซึ่งความสำเร็จของเบิร์กชัวร์ แฮทธาเวย์ ก็คือ บัฟเฟตต์เริ่มลงทุนตั้งแต่อายุยังน้อยและสามารถใช้ความชำนิชำนาญของเขามาทำให้เงินทุนเกิดการงอกเงยแบบทบต้นตลอดช่วงหลายๆทศวรรษที่ผ่านมา
การศึกษาเรียนรู้แบบไม่หยุดยั้ง (Constant Learning) มังเกอร์กล่าวว่า บัฟเฟตต์ เปรียบเสมือน"เครื่องที่ทำหน้าที่ศึกษาเล่าเรียน"ที่ดีที่สุด ปัจจัยหลักที่นำมาซึ่งความสำเร็จก็คือ การเรียนรู้อย่างต่อเนื่องตลอดชั่วชีวิตของคุณด้วยความอยากชนิดมูมมาม ต่อมามังเกอร์ได้วกกลับมาพูดถึงหัวข้อนี้อีกโดยบอกว่าวิธีการให้ได้มาซึ่งปัญญาภูมิทำได้โดย"นั่งลงเอาหลังคุณพิงเก้าอี้และอ่านตลอดทั้งวัน"
มุ่งสมาธิอย่างจดจ่อ (Concentration) อีกปัจจัยที่นำมาซึ่งความสำเร็จของเบิร์กชัวร์ ก็คือ การทุ่มเททางจิตใจอย่างหนักโดยจดจ่อสมาธิต่องานด้วยตัวบัฟเฟตต์เอง "เป็นเรื่องยากที่จะนึกถึงคณะกรรมการต่างๆที่ได้เคยประสบความสำเร็จ" มังเกอร์เปรียบเฉกเช่นกลยุทธของจอห์น วู๊ดเด็นที่ใช้วิธีหมุนเวียนผู้เล่นในทีม โค้ชผู้ยิ่งใหญ่ของ ยูซีแอลเอ จะใช้ผู้เล่นแค่ 7 คน จากทั้งหมด 12 คนเล่น ทั้งนี้เพื่อจะได้สามารถมุ่งเน้นถ่ายทอดประสบการณ์ให้กับผู้เล่นที่เก่งที่สุด 7 คนเหล่านั้น ในทำนองเดียวกันงานส่วนใหญ่ของเบิร์กชัวร์จะได้รับการเอาใจใส่ด้วยสมาธิที่จดจ่อจากผู้ที่มีจิตใจดีที่สุดในองค์กร นั่นก็คือ จิตใจของบัฟเฟตต์
โน็ตสำหรับการดำรงค์ชีพอย่างเป็นสุข
มังเกอร์ ได้ให้ข้อแนะนำสำหรับการมีชีวิตอย่างเป็นสุขด้วยอารมณ์ขันและแจ่มแจ้ง ต่อไปนี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งหัวใจของภูมิปัญญาที่ว่า
- มังเกอร์ กล่าวว่า ผู้คนที่เฉลี่ยวฉลาดจำนวนมากปิดกั้นตัวเองด้วยความไม่เข้าท่า ตัวอย่างอันหนึ่ง คือ การเป็นคนประเภทมีอุดมคติสุดๆ เท่ากับว่า"เป็นการนำเอาสมองของคุณออกมาแล้วเริ่มลงมือใช้ฆ้อนทุบมัน"
- มุ่งเน้นไว้ในชีวิตว่า "ต้องทำให้เป้าหมายที่ตั้งไว้บรรลุถึงจุดสูงสุด"
- "คุณต้องเรียนรู้ที่จะเสาะแสวงหาวิธีการเรียนรู้"
- "เป็นเรื่องไร้สาระอย่างสิ้นเชิงที่จะมัวแต่คิดว่าโลกนี้ไม่ได้ให้ความยุติธรรมกับคุณเลย เรื่องยากที่เกินความสามารถที่มีอยู่เดิมทุกๆเรื่อง นั่นแหละคือโอกาส"
- "การมีเหตุมีผลเพิ่มขึ้นอีกเล็กน้อยจะทำให้คุณสามารถทำอะไรได้มากกว่าที่เคยได้โดยไม่ถูกทำโทษ"
- "ผมจะไม่บ่นเรื่องของอายุผมเพราะถ้าไม่มีอายุมาเกี่ยวข้อง ก็เท่ากับว่าผมก้อตายแค่นั้นเอง"
บทส่งท้าย
มีผู้ตั้งคำถามคนหนึ่งถามเกี่ยวกับเรื่องความเชื่อแบบชนิดยึดติดอย่างมากที่มังเกอร์ได้สลัดทิ้งออกไปเมื่อเร็วๆนี้ ภายหลังครุ่นคิดอยู่พักใหญ่ มังเกอร์กล่าวตอบแสดงความเห็นว่า การที่เบิร์กชัวร์เข้าซื้อหุ้นกิจการรถไฟเมื่อไม่นานมานี้เป็นการบ่งชี้ถึงการเปลี่ยนแนวคิดต่ออุตสาหกรรมดังกล่าวอย่างชนิดที่หมุนกลับมุม 180 องศา ตามที่มังเกอร์พูดปัจจุบันการรถไฟมีความได้เปรียบทางการแข่งขันอย่างมหาศาลเหนือกว่ารถบรรทุก อย่างเช่น การจัดทำรถขนสินค้าแบบ 2 ชั้น และการใช้ระบบคอมพิวเตอร์ควบคุมระบบการเดินรถ มังเกอร์บอกว่าเขาและบัฟเฟตต์เข้าใจถึงความเปลี่ยนแปลงต่างๆนี้ช้าเกินไปและน่าที่จะทำเงินได้มากกว่านี้ อย่างที่เห็นๆ บิล เกตส์เข้าใจเรื่องนี้ตั้งแต่เมื่อ 2 ปีก่อนและได้ทำเงินในอัตราหลายเท่าจากกิจการรถไฟ
มังเกอร์แนะนำหนังสือ 2 เล่ม ได้แก่ The Martains of Science: Five Physicists Who Changed the Twentieth Century by Istvan Hagittai and Einstein: His Life and Unverse by Walter Isaacson. มังเกอร์บอกว่าเขาได้เคยอ่านหนังสือประวัติของไอน์สไตน์ทุกเล่ม และเล่มใหม่ล่าสุดดังกล่าวที่แต่งโดย Isaacson เป็นเล่มดีที่สุด
ตลาดแบบไร้ประสิทธิภาพมี 2 ชนิด ชนิดหนึ่ง เป็นไปแบบไม่ชัดเจนแทบสังเกตุไม่เห็น และอีกชนิดเกิดจากการกระทำของคนโง่ อย่างหลังนี้เกิดขึ้นอยู่เรื่อยเป็นพักๆ
ตวน แทรน มีหุ้นที่พูดไว้ข้างต้นจำนวนหนึ่ง: BRK.B
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